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1 .  MEASURING THE IMPACT OF FTAS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
INCE the early 1980s, there has been a continuing, energetic and 45 sophisticated effort to assess the economic consequences of the 
Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). ' This work has been conducted both in an 
academic setting, in government and in private sector consulting firms. The most 
interesting of these studies have employed computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models to characterise the US, Canadian and Mexican economies and 
their interrelationships. The dimensions specified in these models typically 
include a number of industrial sectors, the form of technology, demand, the 
clearing of factor markets and goods markets, external relationships and trade 
policy. Most of these studies find that CUSTA and NAFTA, while having little 
effect on the United States, can have a significant impact on the structure and 
operation of the Canadian and Mexican economies. 
While much of the CGE research agrees as to conclusions, these findings rest 
very heavily on how technology, productivity, and most importantly, on how the 
behaviour of capital is modelled. By any reasonable criterion, much of the 
modelling in these areas is crudely done.2 Moreover, by the standards of 
sectoral research, these models are highly aggregated and non-tariff trade policy, 
in particular, is treated at an extremely rudimentary level. 
It has not been generally recognised that another tradition of research in 
international economics might be helpful for evaluating the consequences of trade 
liberalisation and FTAs. The slow pace of adjustment of exchange rate changes in 
the 1970s and again in the mid- and late 1980s triggered substantial research 
efforts which continue today. In empirical work explaining the slow response of 
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prices to exchange rate changes and the slow response of quantities to the price 
changes that do take place, special emphasis has been placed on contractual 
obligations and habit per~istence.~ The resulting literature asks how long it 
takes short-run inelasticities of supply and demand to give way to the long-run 
equilibrium of full pass through of exchange rate changes into prices. 
In something of a departure from earlier analyses of the impact of exchange 
rate changes on trade flows, in recent years there has been considerable focus on 
the role of market structure in shaping this process. This newer approach 
suggests that in any given sector, whether exchange rate changes lead to large 
relative price changes or negligible price changes will depend on such industrial 
structure considerations as the degree of market concentration, the extent of 
product homogeneity and substitutability and the relative market shares of 
domestic and foreign firms.4 Even absent long-term contracts and habitual 
behaviour, strategic behaviour will indicate widely varying price response across 
industries to exchange rate changes. In contrast with the earlier literature, less 
than full pass through may be an equilibrium response for many industries. 
Because much of this newer literature assumes that firms behave strategically 
not only by virtue of having market power, but also by being able to segment the 
market at home and various markets abroad from one another, it can be used to 
provide a new perspective on the economic impact of the CUSTA and NAFTA. 
The maintained hypothesis of these so-called pricing-to-market models is that 
firms can segregate their markets, charging prices that differ by more than the 
cost of transportation between them. For this kind of market power to be present, 
it is not sufficient that there be economies of scale and/or product differentiation. 
Rather, what is critical is the presence of trade barriers between markets. Implicit 
in the estimation of such models are indirect measures of some of the potential 
gains at the very detailed sectoral level that might come from FTA sponsored 
trade and investment liberalisation. Such measures can be found by investigating 
to what degree, prior to the implementation of the CUSTA, did foreign firms 
behave as if the Canadian and American markets were substantially segregated 
from one another? And, more generally, to what degree did foreign firms behave 
as if all the North American markets were substantially segregated from one 
another? In the process of learning about North America’s external adjustment 
process, a great deal can be learned about North American trade relations. A 
hitherto unexamined thread between regional integration and the adjustment 
process can also be explored. In the next section the conceptual framework for 
analysing the pricing behaviour of firms in foreign markets will be discussed. 
See Magee (1973) and Wilson and Takacs (1980). 
This approach is stressed in Krugrnan (1987) and Dornbusch (1987). Among recent empirical 
studies using this general approach are Feenstra (1987), Froot and Klemperer (1989), Ohno (1989), 
Marston (1990), Knetter (1992) and Saxonhouse (1993). 
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This framework is then used to study the behaviour of Japanese firms exporting 
to each of the North American markets. 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION MODEL5 
In investigating the questions just raised, an explicit framework is necessary. 
Assume that commodity arbitrage is ineffective such that 
4i f r,n, ( 1 )  
where & = price of good i in the home market in home currency, I, = price of 
good i in foreign marketfin foreign currency, and rf = exchange rate between 
home currency and foreign market f currency. 
In general, the differences in prices across markets will be determined by the 
differences in demand conditions across markets and their relationship to the 
producer’s common marginal cost. As is well known, the gap between price in 
each market (expressed in domestic currency) and the marginal cost will be given 
by 
where Di = price elasticity of demand for good i in the domestic market, and D, 
= price elasticity of demand for good i in the foreign market. 
There are three possibilities for the pass through of exchange rate changes into 
foreign prices. 
a. Full Pass Through 
If the demand curves in domestic and overseas markets have constant price 
elasticities, relative prices for good i across markets will be invariant. With 
constant price elasticity of demand curves, in equilibrium, exchange rate changes 
will always be fully passed through to foreign markets. 
b. LRss than Full Pass Through 
Less than full pass through of exchange rate changes will occur when demand 
curves are less convex than the constant elasticity of demand curve. In such 
cases, the elasticity of demand will vary directly with price changes. In 
This section follows the discussions in Krugman (1987), Dornbusch (1987), Marston (1990), 
Feenstra (1987), Knetter (1992) and Saxonhouse (1993). 
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particular, a fall in price will lower price elasticity and a rise in price will raise it. 
From (2), it is seen that in this instance a fall (rise) in price will raise (lower) the 
gap between price and marginal cost. 
Under these demand conditions, when the yen appreciates, the price of the 
good in the foreign market rises and the gap between foreign price and marginal 
cost must narrow. If marginal costs are constant, the gap between price and 
marginal cost will remain the same in the domestic market. This is an obvious 
case of less than full pass through. In this case, pass through will vary across 
markets inversely with the convexity of the demand curves in price. 
Alternatively, the more the elasticity of demand varies directly with price, the 
less pass through will be observed. 
c. Greater than Full Pass Through 
By contrast with the case just described, when demand functions are more 
convex than the constant elasticity of price case, exchange rate changes will lead 
to greater than full pass through.6 In this case, a price increase will make 
demand less elastic. For example, a yen appreciation by raising the foreign price 
of a good will increase the gap between the price abroad and marginal cost. Once 
again, with constant marginal costs, the gap between price and costs at home will 
remain the same. With yen appreciation, prices in terms of yen for goods abroad 
will rise relative to the yen price of the same goods at home. In this simple case, 
yen appreciation may lead to a rush to concede markets abroad in the interest of 
profits. 
d. Cost Factors 
Just as differences in the shape of demand curves are critical for explaining 
differences in the reaction of foreign markets to exchange rate changes, in this 
price discrimination framework they are also critical for explaining the influence 
of other factors on the differences between prices at home and abroad for the 
same good. For example, in the constant elasticity of demand case, since relative 
prices are invariant to any kind of change, so, as with exchange rate changes, 
changes in wages and other cost factors will have no impact. More generally, the 
same results will hold even if demand curves have variable elasticities, provided 
they have the same curvature. 
In light of the above discussion, and considering that income in domestic and 
foreign markets can be expected to influence demand at home and abroad, 
Marston (1990). 
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equation (3) can be adopted as an explanation of sectoral relative prices or 
sectoral pass through: 
4. W m 
log 6i = log = p1 log q + p2 log - + p3 log - + p4 log x + P5 log x 
(3) 
‘f Uif P P 
where q = real exchange rate, w/p = real wages, m/p = real raw material prices, 
h = domestic income or domestic activity, and x = foreign income or foreign 
activity. 
Note that equation (3) assumes that firms set prices instantaneously in response 
to changes in the right-hand-side variables. If prices are preset, however, these 
variations in ai may simply reflect unanticipated events such as changes in the 
exchange rate. To allow for this possibility, and following Marston (1990) and 
Meese and Rogoff (1988), it is assumed that both ‘-and q follow random walks. 
This means (3), with time subscripted by t ,  becomes 
where E, -, = expectation on variable in period t from information available at 
t -  1. 
Equation (4) indicates that if no strategic pricing behaviour is being employed 
and the pi = 0, then the impact of exchange rate surprises on 6;, will be short- 
lived. In the absence of further changes, after a single period, 6i will return to its 
original level. It is equation (4) that will be estimated below to throw new light on 
the presence of trade barriers in North America. The coefficient O0 on the change 
in the nominal exchange rate in equation (4) will indicate whether there is a lag in 
price setting. Recall the coefficient on the real exchange rate, p l ,  will measure the 
proportion of the real exchange rate change passed through into prices. 
e. Data 
Ideally, equation (4) might be estimated for each export line to each economy 
in the Western Hemisphere from each economy both within and outside the 
Western Hemisphere. At present data are only available for exporters based in 
Japan. In particular, the behaviour of Japanese firms exporting to Canada, the 
United States and Mexico is our focus for analysis in this paper. Studying the 
pricing behaviour of Japanese firms not only provides considerable insight into 
North American trade relations, it also helps assess the extent to which Japanese 
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firms may benefit from the lack of full economic integration here. In the Fall of 
1993, the Clinton Administration has repeatedly claimed that were NAFTA not 
to pass the US Congress, Japan would be better off.’ The research to be 
reported below can help to assess this claim. 
Equation (4) has been estimated for each of 41 product lines. These product 
line equations have been estimated for each of the North American markets using 
monthly data from January 1983 to June 1988. For each of the product lines, the 
Bank of Japan’s wholesale price index for that product is used as the Japanese 
domestic price. In place of detailed country-specific compatible export price 
data, unit value indices have been constructed for each product line and each 
country from the Japan Tariff Association trade data. Admittedly, making use of 
bilateral unit value indices for relatively narrow, specific product lines in place of 
authentic price data may introduce a great deal of error into this estimation 
procedure. Nonetheless, because it is a relative price equation and not an import 
demand or export supply equation that is being estimated, the problems posed by 
using such data are not insurmountable. After all, this variable appears only on 
the left-hand side of all the equations being estimated here.8 
The one set of data from non-Japanese sources is the monthly production 
indexes used as the activity variable in equation (4). These indexes have been 
gathered from the monthly or yearly statistical bulletins of the USA, Canada, 
Mexico and Japan.9 The remaining variables, including the Japanese 
manufacturing wages, Japanese raw material prices and the bilateral exchange 
rates, are all readily available. lo Finally, in each instance, nominal variables are 
converted to real variables by deflating with the Japanese wholesale prices index. 
3. ESTIMATION, RESULTS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Altogether, 123 equations have been estimated with the data just outlined. Each 
equation is estimated with 66 observations after logarithms of each variable have 
been first differenced and distributed lags applied. Results of this estimation are 
presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
As indicated, interest should focus on the coefficients on the change in the 
nominal exchange rate and the coefficients on the level of the real exchange rate. 
Examining the latter first, 105 out of a possible total of 123 coefficients on the 
level of the real exchange rate are statistically different from zero. At the level of 
Golden (1993). 
* See Froot (1988). 
Nihon ginkb (1993a). 
l o  Nihon ginkb (1993b). 
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TABLE 1 
Statistically Significant Variables by Country in Relative Price Equation (4) 
United States Canada Mexico 
Statistically Significant Price 
Setting Lag, 8, # 0 
Statistically Significant Strategic 
Price Setting, p,  # 0 
Other Variables Statistically 
Significant, p2 # 0, p3 # 0 ,  
















Note: The numbers in each cell refer to the number of equations in which a statistically significant variable 
with the row heading listed appeared. The last three rows present R2s regardless of the level of statistical 
significance. 
the individual foreign markets, these results confirm findings from many studies 
for aggregated overseas markets. Strategic pricing is a pervasive phenomenon. 11 
Of particular interest here, Japanese exporters exhibit this behaviour in all three 
North American markets. 
Not all the 105 coefficients on the real exchange rate are positive. In 13 cases, 
this coefficient is negative, illustrating the situation where exchange rate changes 
are more than passed through into foreign prices. Seven of these cases involve the 
Mexican market, four the Canadian market and three the American market. 
These cases may reflect nothing more than the relatively small size of some of the 
markets being investigated here and the resulting instability of some of the unit 
value indexes being used as dependent variables. 
While strategic pricing is a pervasive phenomenon among Japanese exporters 
to North America, there are also a significant number of cases where exporters 
do not exhibit this behaviour and fully pass through exchange rate changes. This 
full pass through can occur even though there may be significant lags in the 
resetting of goods prices quoted in yen. At the same time, there may be 
significant lags in the resetting of goods prices quoted in yen even where there is 
strategic pricing. Overall, in 55 cases out of 123, a statistically significant 
coefficient was found on the change in the nominal exchange rate variable. 
' I  See, for example, Marston (1990) who finds evidence of strategic pricing behaviour by Japanese 
and American firms by studying firm behaviour in all markets taken together. Unlike Marston, but 
in common with this paper, Froot (1988), Saxonhouse (1993) and Knetter (1992) find evidence of 
strategic pricing at the level of the individual foreign market. 
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TABLE 2 
Statistically Significant Variables by Product Line in Relative Price Equation (4) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Statistically 
Statistically Significant Other Variables 
Significant Strategic Statistically Significant 
(pz  # 0, p j  # 0 
p 4  # 0 and/or p s  # 0) 
Price Setting Lug Price Setting 
(6, f 0) ( p ,  # 0) 
Paper and Paper Board 
Polystyrene 




Steel Sheet for Pilings 
Hot-rolled Wide Steel strips 
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TABLE 3 
Overseas Market and the Length of the Price-Setting Lag 
United States Canada Mexico 
Lag Length (Months) 
1 
2 
4 3 2 
4 4 4 
3 6 6 3 
4 5 4 5 
5 2 3 3 
Tables 3 and 4 group these cases by commodity and country and length of price- 
resetting lag. 
There is more to learn from this study than just that Japanese firms practice 
strategic price setting behaviour in all their North American markets for almost 
all the goods in the sample used here. What is of special interest is whether 
strategic price-setting behaviour varies not just by product lines but also across 
North American markets. It is this variation that is most likely to be eliminated by 
NAFTA. What is really of interest here are the following hypotheses: 
Strategic price setting behaviour does not vary across the American, 
Mexican and Canadian markets 
H, 
PA1 = PCl = PMl. 
H2 Strategic price setting behaviour differs between each of the North 
American markets 
PA1 PCl PMl*  
H3 Strategic price setting behaviour is the same in Canada and Mexico, but 
differs between those countries and the United States 
PMI = PCl # P A I .  
H, Strategic price setting behaviour is the same in the United States and 
Mexico, but differs between those countries and Canada 
PMI = PA1 PCi. 
H, Strategic price setting behaviour is the same in the United States and 
Canada, but differs between those countries and Mexico 
PA1 = PCl P M , .  
Each of these hypotheses embodies a separate model and these models can be 
compared pairwise. This is a model selection problem and the best-performing 
model in each pairwise comparison can be selected using likelihood dominance 
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TABLE 4 
Product and Length of Price Re-Setting Lag 
Lag Length (Months) I 2 3 4 5 
Paper and Paper Board 
Polystyrene 




Steel Sheet for Piling 
Hot-rolled Wide Steel Strips 






























Video Tape Recorders 
Electronic Organs 
Wooden Furniture 
criteria.I2 These pairwise comparisons are performed for each of the 41 product 
lines. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5. 
This test is discussed in Pollak and Wales (1991). Related tests are discussed in Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1981) and in Pesaran and Deaton (1978). 
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In the pairwise comparisons conducted, for almost all product lines, the 
hypothesis that there are significant differences in strategic price setting 
behaviour between each of the North American markets in the 1980s dominates. 
In light of the CGE results discussed earlier, it is particularly interesting that this 
hypothesis clearly dominates over the alternative hypothesis that Canadian and 
American strategic price-setting behaviour was indistinguishable, while their 
behaviour together is statistically significantly different from Mexican strategic 
price-setting behaviour. While based on a relatively limited number of product 
lines and while general equilibrium effects are not considered, the results here are 
suggestive. Prior to the implementation of the CUSTA and prior to the 
negotiations about NAFTA, Japanese firms, and presumably firms based in other 
countries as well, including those based in North America, were able to 
effectively segregate proximate markets in North America. Significant barriers to 
commodity arbitrage existed not just between Mexico and the rest of North 
America, but also between Canada and the United States. These barriers may 
have been sufficiently important as to affect the global adjustment process. As 
previous research indicates, removing the barriers which allow Japanese firms 
and other firms to segregate North American markets from one another should be 
of tangible benefit to North American ~ e 1 f a r e . l ~  In this sense, the Clinton 
Administration is correct in suggesting that NAFTA can be beneficial to the 
United States at Japanese expense. It is just as likely, however, to be beneficial to 
the United States at the expense of any country whose firms are able to make use 
of existing intra-North American trade barriers to price discriminate across North 
American markets. 
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